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Proprioception, n. Physiol. the ability to sense, without
seeing or touching, how the different parts of the body relate
to each other, in space, position, posture, and internal
condition.'
I. INTRODUCTION
There are two paradoxes at the heart of what we do. First, while law is
fundamentally about regulating human behavior, it has no independent
theory ofhuman behavior. Second, while all behavior relevant to law arises
from the functional design of the human brain, we in law have historically
exhibited little interest in learning anything about brain design. As a
consequence, we maintain and often unknowingly manifest a rather quaint
view of the relationship between behavior and brain-a view in which the
brain is a general-purpose computer, utterly lacking in significant,
meaningful, behavior-biasing, information-processing predispositions.
Picture for a moment the following body parts, momentarily
disembodied: a heart, an eye, and a brain. If you are like most people, you
see a muscular heart, with tubes running in and out, each dedicated to
directing blood either to or fro. You are aware that inside the heart are four
chambers, each equipped with a one-way valve, through which the blood
is pumped. The heart has a visible, tangible, accessible, straightforward
functionality.
I. This is an amalgam of several definitions, including those appearing in TBE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989); THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (15th ed. 2001);
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND BIOLOGY (1986).
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You see an eye in its circular profile. You are aware that light crosses
the cornea, passes through a refracting and focusing lens, and then
stimulates retinal cells in the rear. The eye, too, has a visible, tangible,
accessible, straightforward functionality.
And you see a two-hemisphered brain which, for all its storied
capacities, just sits there like a bumpy lump of smart jello. There is no
discernible movement in this organ. And, in contrast to virtually every
other feature of the body, the brain's form offers little hint to its function.
It deals in the invisibles of electricity, information, and consciousness. For
this reason, among others, we do not ordinarily consider the brain to be as
functionally specialized as the other organs of the body. That is, we do not
ordinarily consider it to have physical design features for channeling
information along specific behavior-biasing pathways the way the heart
channels blood or the eye channels light.
The brain is not, in fact, as functionally specialized as the heart or eye.
But acknowledging this need not require our current assumption that the
brain is, for all important purposes, not very specialized at all. What would
it mean for law if the brain were far more specialized than we commonly
think? The heart has been designed by evolutionary processes to pump
blood-a fluid of specific weight and viscosity, meaningfully dissimilar to
tree sap. The eye has been designed by evolutionary processes to attend
only to particular wavelengths of light-ignoring others, to which bees, for
example, are sensitive. What if the brain, in generating its behavioral
outputs, has been similarly designed by evolutionary processes to perform
quite specific tasks-reflecting a specific (though invisible) neural
architecture, rather than some amalgam of general-purpose, do-anything,
interconnected cells? And what if those tasks, while not rigidly
determining behavior, instead materially increase and decrease the
probabilities of certain behaviors, upon encounters with certain patterns of
stimuli? What if, in short, the brain is more akin to a swiss army knife,
with particular tools appropriate to particular tasks, than it is akin to an
empty beaker into which society pours some mind-bestowing elixir called
culture?2
In fact, a growing body of evidence from behavioral biology (and
cognates such as neuroanatomy) has revealed the brain to be quite
functionally specialized, as a result of non-random and knowable
evolutionary processes (including natural and sexual selection).3 That is,
2. The metaphor of the swiss army knife is commonly attributed to Leda Cosmides and John
Tooby. The phrase "mind-bestowing elixir" is Steven Pinker's. STEVEN PINKER, How THE MND
WORKS 19 (1997).
3. It would be impractical to summarize these processes here, and some familiarity must be
assumed. Summaries written specifically for legal thinkers appear in Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary
Analysis in Law: An Introduction and Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117 (1997)
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the principal, biological task of the brain is to process information in ways
that tend to bias behavior in ways that contributed to continued survival
and reproductive success in the face of specific challenges commonly
encountered in deep ancestral environments.
My general purpose, here, is to explore several implications for law of
this research in behavioral biology. In prior work, I have attempted to
demonstrate that behavioral biology has practical utility in the arena of
legal affairs, if deployed with care (and non-normatively) in a process that
I have referred to as "evolutionary analysis in law." That analysis, in part,
[hereinafter Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law] (Part I provides "A Primer in Law-Relevant
Evolutionary Biology"); Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward
Explanation andPrevention, 87 CAL. L. REV. 827 (1999) [hereinafter Jones, Biology ofRape]; and
Timothy H. Goldsmith & Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Biology and Behavior: A BriefOverview
andSome Important Concepts, 39 JURIMErRICS J. 131 (1999).
Treatments of modem behavioral biology for the general audience include: TIMOTHY H.
GOLDSMITH, THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HUMAN NATURE: FORGING LINKS BETWEEN EVOLUTION
AND BEHAVIOR (1991); PINKER, supra note 2; MATr RIDLEY, TE RED QUEEN: SEX AND THE
EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE (1994); ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOLOGY AND EVERYDAY LIFE (1994).
Textbooks for gaining more technical familiarity with behavioral biology include: JOHN
ALCOCK, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (6th ed. 1998); DAVID Buss,
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: THE NEW SCIENCE OF THE MIND (1999); MARTIN DALY & MARGO
WILSON, SEX, EVOLUTION, AND BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1983); SCOTT FREEMAN & JON C. HERRON,
EVOLUrIONARYANALYSIS (Ist ed. 1998); DOUGLAS J.FuTUYMA,EVOLUTIONARYBIOLOGY (2d ed.
1986); TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH & WILLIAM F. ZIMMERMAN, BIOLOGY, EVOLUTION, AND HUMAN
NATURE (2001); JAMES L. GOULD & CAROL GRANTGOULD, SEXUAL SELECTION (1989); J.R. KREBS
& N.B. DAVIES, AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIOURAL ECOLOGY (3d ed. 1993); MARK RIDLEY,
EVOLUTION (1993); ROBERT TRivERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION (1985).
4. The term first appears in Jones, EvolutionaryAnalysis in Law, supra note 3, at 1124. This
was not the first time that law and behavioral biology had been linked. The general idea that legal
thinkers should take account of the influence of human biological heritage on human behavior
relevant to law has been raised on numerous occasions, in a variety of contexts. And such work
provides important background for all that I attempt here. See, e.g., RICHARD ALEXANDER,
Evolutionm Law, and Justice, in DARWINISM AND HUMAN AFFAIRS (1979); JOHN H. BECKSTROM,
EVOLUTIONARYJURISPRUDENCE: PROSPECTS ANDLIMITATIONS ONTHEUSEOF MODERN DARWINISM
THROUGHOUT THE LEGAL PROCESS (1989); THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
LAW (Roger Masters & Margaret Gruter eds., 1992); Monika Gruter Morhenn & Margaret Gruter,
The Evolution ofLaw andBiology, in EVOLUTIONARYAPPROACHES INTHEBEHAVIORAL SCIENCES:
TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF HUMANNATURE 119 (Steven A. Peterson & Albert Somit
eds., 2001); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992); Amicus Brief of the Gruter Institute,
In the Matter ofBaby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); Kingsley R. Browne, Sex and Temperament
in Modern Society: A Darwinian View of the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap, 37 ARIZ. L. REV.
972 (1995); E. Donald Elliott, Law and Biology: The New Synthesis?, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 595
(1997); Robin Fox, In the Matter of "Baby M": Report from the "Gruter Institute for Law and
Behavior Research, 7 POL. & LIFE SCI. 77 (1988); Lawrence Frolik, The Biological Roots of the
Undue Influence Doctrine: What's Love GottoDo With It?, 57 U. PIT. L. REV. 841 (1996); Oliver
Goodenough, Biology, Behavior, and Criminal Law: Seeking a Responsible Approach to an
Inevitable Interchange, 22 VT. L. REV. 263 (1998); Mark F. Grady & Michael T. McGuire, A
[Vol. 53
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investigates what can be learned about law-relevant human behaviors from
the study of evolutionary processes that have influenced them, and how
that knowledge may increase the effectiveness of law in pursuing pre-
existing legal goals. For example, evolutionary analysis can clearly aid our
efforts to understand and prevent child abuse, and to understand and
prevent sexual aggression.' What I want to attempt here, however, is to
take this enterprise of linking behavioral biology and law to a more
systemic, theoretical level, which may offer new insights about the
relationship between law, biology, and human behavior. In particular, I
will explore how the function and form of the human brain, in light of
what we are learning from behavioral biology, affects and reflects the
function and form of law.
Four Parts follow. Part II provides context. It first introduces a
metaphor from physiology that provides analytic direction to the balance
of the Article, and then clarifies the aspects of behavioral biology on which
my discussion focuses. Part III concerns the function of law. Part IV
concerns law's form. Part V provides a summary, as a prerequisite to
discussion of several related issues.
Theory of the Origin of Natural Law, 8 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 87 (1997); Margaret Gruter,
Law in Sociobiological Perspective, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 181 (1977); Cheryl Hanna, Can a
Biological Inquiry Help Reduce Male Violence Against Women?, 22 VT. L. REV. 333 (1997); John
0. McGinnis, The Original Constitution and Our Origins, 19 HARV.J.L. &PUB.POL'Y251 (1996);
William H. Rodgers, Jr., Bringing People Back: Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Taking in
Natural Resources Law, 10 ECOLOGYL.Q. 205 (1982); Jeffrey E. Stake, Darwin, Donations, and
the Illusion of Dead Hand Control, 64 TuL. L. REv. 705 (1990); Margo Wilson, Impact of the
Uncertainty of Paternity on Family Law, 45 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 217 (1987); E. Donald
Elliott & Roger Masters, Seminar on Ethology of Law: Biological Bases of Legal Behavior, Yale
Law School (1988); and sources cited in Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 2, at
1121-23 n.3 (1997).
A partial listing of many other sources relevant to the connection between law and evolution
appears on the "Readings" page of the website for the Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law
(SEAL), at http://www.sealsite.org. Interest in these topics has grown quickly, due in part to
programs organized since 1981 by the Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research (about
which see http://www.gruterinstitute.org), and more recently by the Society for Evolutionary
Analysis in Law (http://www.sealsite.org).
5. See, e.g., Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 3; Jones, Biology of Rape,
supra note 3. For further information on these subjects, see Owen D. Jones, Law and Biology:
Toward an Integrated Model of Human Behavior, 8 J. CONTAMP. LEGAL ISSUES 167 (1997)
[hereinafter Jones, Law and Biology]; Owen D. Jones, Law and the Biology of Rape: Reflections
on Transitions, 11 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 151 (2000).
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II. PROPRIOCEPTION AND BEHAVIORAL BIOLOGY
A. Proprioception
Proprioception is a term from physiology that refers to the ability to
sense, without seeing or touching, how the different parts of the body relate
to each other, in space, position, posture, and internal condition.6
Proprioception in humans is accomplished by means of hidden receptors
that sense muscle stretch, joint position, and tendon tension-in ways that
would allow you, for example, to close your eyes, reach behind your head,
and touch your fingertips together. Proprioception is useful because it
provides a sense, in the absence of external clues, of where you are, where
you have been, where you are going, and what-in effect-is
physiologically possible.
My question is this: What would it mean to have proprioceptive sense
of law? My conclusion is that it would mean several different things at
once. First, it would mean that we would have greater awareness than we
now manifest of the deep internal structure of law, reflected in the
subsurface interconnections between the many limbs of law. Second, it
would mean that we had a sharper sense of why legal systems in the world
are as they are today. Third, it would mean that we could better predict
where law can go, how, and with what likely effects. Finally, it would
mean that we would have a more robust theoretical basis on which to
fashion better methods for achieving the goals of law.
If we would find these things valuable then, it seems to me, we should
more actively seek to gain and develop a proprioceptive sense of law. We
might begin to do this by considering more closely the dynamic processes
that influence the relationship between law and human behavior. That
would require that we become more attentive to the possibilities and
constraints that those processes contribute to the shape and movement of
the body of law. That attention, in turn, would require a better appreciation
of both the function and form of law.
Because behavioral biology can highlight new aspects of law's form
and law's function, it is one of several disciplines that is useful in
developing a proprioceptive sense of law. Behavioral biology enables us
to better understand the processes that built the human brain that has in
turn built that structure of law. Following some definitional preliminaries
in the brief section immediately below, we will therefore turn to consider
how behavioral biology may add to our understanding of function and form
in law, in furtherance of a proprioceptive perspective.
6. See supra note 1.
[Vol, 53
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B. Behavioral Biology
I have used the term behavioral biology several times, without yet
defining it. This is, in part, because the breadth of things comprising
behavioral biology defies easy synopsis. But here is one way to understand
both the important components of behavioral biology and my specific
meaning when I refer to it.
When most people think of the relationship between law and the field
of biology, generally, they think first of such things as the legal regulation
of, among other things, healthcare, genetically engineered foods, new
reproductive technologies, and environmentally damaging products and
activities. In my experience, people rarely think of law and biology as
extending meaningfully into the realm of behavior. On those occasions
when people do think of law and the biology of behavior, they tend to
think exclusively of behavioral genetics (though typically not in that term).
And this often leads them (quite improperly, as it turns out) to think that
behavioral biology's principal relevance to law is in criminal trials and
genetic defenses. Allergic responses ensue. This is most unfortunate, and
it likely follows from two things.
First, biology has been over-separated, in universities, from other things
interesting about life.7 So we are unpracticed in recognizing how biological
processes influence all aspects of the human condition, directly or
indirectly. Second, what little background most people have acquired in
biology is principally anatomical, rather than behavioral. We studied the
parts of a flower, but not how it came to pass that flowers turn toward the
sun, rather than away from it. We studied the parts of a frog, but not why
males are more likely to compete for the attention of females than vice
versa. We studied the physical characteristics of birds, but not the process
by which it came to pass that males of singing species sing more in the
spring than they do in the fall. And if we reached humans at all, in our
biological coursework, we studied human physiology. We did not study
why the human brain is set up in a way that induces the specific states of
the nervous system we call emotions, in response to some kinds of stimuli
but not to others.
As a result, there is ample room for the mistaken notion that biology is
both mechanistic and deterministic and, in the human context, somehow
inconsistent with the idea that culture, environment, learning, and
behavioral flexibility are essential features of the human condition. As a
consequence, many people apparently view biology as the study of living
mechanisms, with assembly-line products, or the study of mundane
molecular and physical interactions that are taken as given.
7. For more on this point, see Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: Some
Objections Considered, 67 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001).
837
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' But to understand behavior in light of this popular misconception of
biology is (to paraphrase the Chinese philosopher Lao Tsu) like trying to
understand running water by catching it in a bucket. In fact, humans are
participants in a dynamic process, subject to powerful evolutionary forces
that blend environment, learning, culture, and behavioral flexibility into
the flow of genetically influenced human development, activities,
experience, and achievements. So evolutionary processes are not only
consistent with extraordinary human capacities for rational analysis and
decisionmaking, they have helped to create them. Yet the presence of such
capacities does not logically imply the absence of any behavioral
predispositions. Even a moment's reflection makes obvious that all living
organisms must come equipped with behavioral predispositions. For an
anatomy lacking behavioral predispositions does nothing, and is soon dead.
Behavioral predispositions are therefore inherent in the behavior of all
living organisms, including humans, and they can manifest themselves in
condition-dependent, subtle, variable, responsive, algorithmic, complex
ways. Although we cannot know all of those ways, we can know a great
deal about the processes that influenced the connections between
environment, behavior, and reproductive success that led to behavioral
predispositions. These processes include, of course, natural and sexual
selection.
To think about the effect of these processes on humans, we need to step
back and recognize a distinction between the two main components of
behavioral biology. The first component is behavioral genetics. It mainly
involves efforts to trace the different behaviors of different individuals to
different genes among them.8 There is arole for behavioral genetics in law.
I think, however, that the long-term promise of behavioral genetics for law
is comparatively limited. Accordingly, it is not the component of
behavioral biology I intend to discuss below.
The second component, more promising in my view, goes by many
often confusing names, including behavioral ecology, evolutionary
biology, ethology, evolutionary psychology, evolutionary ecology, and
evolutionary anthropology, among others. Not one of the names is without
drawbacks, and each name misconveys scope, to one degree or another.
But the overall, shared perspective transcends efforts to name it, and the
core idea follows this logic. Evolutionary processes (such as natural
selection and sexual selection) combine with environmental and physical
inputs to build the brains that yield behaviors. There is therefore a
necessary and important relationship between the non-random operation
of these evolutionary processes and observable human behaviors. That
8. Technically, the issue is differences in alleles of genes, but it is a common convention to
speak of different genes when one is referring to different alleles.
[Vol. 53
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relationship yields widely-shared (often species-typical) heritable
behavioral predispositions that are often highly condition-dependent. (That
is, they are context-specific-sensitive to varying environmental
circumstances an individual encounters-rather than automatic.) As a
consequence, some of the different behaviors we observe, from different
individuals, can be traced not to different genes but rather to widely-shared
species-typical information-processing algorithms that encounter different
environmental contexts.
This sounds more difficult than it is. To both clarify and oversimplify,
one can consider that behavioral geneticists study how, when encountering
the exact same environment, organism A will respond with behavior X,
and organism B will respond with behavior Y, when A and B have
different genes relevant to that behavior, manifested in slightly different
neural architecture, brain structure, and function.
In important contrast to those interested in behavioral genetics, those
interested inthe evolutionary bases of species-typical behaviors study how,
when encountering different environments, A and B may still respond with
behaviors X and Y respectively, despite the fact that neither their genes nor
their neural architectures differ materially. For example, evolutionary
processes may have equipped the entire population with a conditional
decisional rule that A and B share, which in over-simplified essence
provides: "if in environment E, then employ behavior X, but if in
environment F then employ behavior Y." Thus, the shared genetic
influences on behavior can yield behaviors X and Y from individuals A
and B not because of their genetic differences, but simply because they
encountered environments E and F, respectively. The behavior is
enormously influenced by the environment, but the environment affects the
probability of behavior in ways reflecting the influence of widely-shared
behavioral predispositions. The distinction between behavioral genetics
and behavioral ecology is difficult to overemphasize, and is illustrated in
Figure 1.
To be clear, then, where I use in this Article the broad (but at least
brief) term behavioral biology, it refers to this latter of the two components
of behavioral biology. Specifically, it refers to the behavioral ecology
aspect that attends principally to evolved, species-typical, condition-
dependent, behavior-influencing algorithms that influence the way human
brains process information and thereby increase or decrease the
probabilities of various behaviors.9
9. Again, further background on these subjects is available in the sources cited supra note




Behavioral Genetics Behavioral Ecology
(G .. U. Differoo & Le~.UA&W ftyhtetgle) (Ondlo c-a.t.& SP1W.1Ip~ P.~ydkosi.)
Neural Neural
Architecture Environment Behavior Architecture Environment Behavior
III. THE FUNCTION OF LAW
A- Law as Lever
Proprioception, as mentioned earlier, requires some sense of function.
Gaining a proprioceptive sense of law therefore requires greater awareness
of the function of law. In my view, this awareness can be enhanced, in part,
by thinking of law in terms of physics-an approach that ultimately
clarifies the functional relationship between behavioral biology and law.
We already use many images of physics and physical phenomena to
capture the process and substance of law.'0 We speak of arguments that lay
foundation or provide support, that buttress or bridge, that are filled with
force, power, or the weight of authority, and that are invested with inertia
or momentum, demonstrating reasoning that is linear, circular, or parallel.
We speak of analytic tools, slippery slopes, balancing tests, swinging
10. Examples include Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What
Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1989); Seth P. Waxman, The
Physics ofPersuasion:ArguingtheNew Deal, 88 GEo.L.J. 2399(2000); R. George Wright, Should
the Law Reflect the World?: Lessons for Legal Theory from Quantum Mechanics, 18 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 855 (1991). Useful sources addressing the use of physical metaphors in law include
Bernard J. Hibbitts, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of
American Legal Discourse, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 229 (1994); Note, Organic and Mechanical
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pendulums, narrow ends of wedges, leaps of logic, seamless webs of logic,
and logic stretched to the breaking point. And we often speak of law as
being flexible or rigid.
In my view, however, the most useful and least developed images of
physics are the lever and the fulcrum." Figure 2 conveys the basic idea. 2
In this image, the human behavior that law seeks to affect is represented
as a sphere. The legal mechanism or regime we employ to move that
behavior is represented as a lever. And the fulcrum, upon which the lever
of law lies, and against which it presses to effect a change of behavior, is
the law's behavioral model. By the term behavioral model, I refer to our
conception of where behavior generally comes from and what in particular
influences the specific behavior at issue. For example, if the deployment
of a particular legal mechanism in furtherance of a specific behavioral
modification ever strikes us as at all plausible, it is because we are
11. Like other images from physics mentioned in the text, the lever metaphor has previously
appeared in a wide variety of legal contexts. Sometimes it is used to emphasize the way a lever
multiplies force, effecting large changes with small efforts. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott,
EnvironmentalLaw at a Crossroad, 20 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992) (using the concept ofregulatory
leverage to describe a ratio of government agency expenditures to consequently-and
disproportionally large--redeployed behavior). Sometimes it is used to describe a force applied by
threat ofcriminal conviction. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Releases, Redress, andPolice Misconduct:
Reflections on Agreements to Waive Civil Rights Actions in Exchange for Dismissal of Criminal
Charges, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 929 (1988) ("Both the tradition of legal ethics and the common
law definition of extortion suggest that the use of possible criminal prosecution as leverage to
obtain advantage in a civil lawsuit is inappropriate."); Rachel Ratliff, Third-Party Money
Laundering: Problems of Proof and Prosecutorial Discretion, 7 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REV. 173, 181
(1996) ("To counter these incentives to keep quiet, prosecutors often use the leverage of a potential
criminal charge."). It is often used to describe the economic effects of market power. See, e.g.,
Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 515
(1985) (discussing the "ability of firms to use restrictive practices to leverage theirmonopoly power
from one market to another"). And it has been used in the context of civil disputes as well. See, e.g.,
Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory ofAlimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989) ("The fault rules gave great
bargaining leverage to the spouse who felt no urgency to end the marriage .....
My own uses of the lever metaphor have been for highlighting the necessary existence of a
"fulcrum," which I suggest both best represents the point of transfer between the energy vested in
law and the behavior we hope to achieve with the tools of law and also focuses attention on the utter
dependence of law on solid knowledge about human behavior. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones, Evolution,
Value-Clarification, and Legal Policy, Address at the Human Behavior and Evolution Society
Annual Meeting (July 1, 1995); Jones, Law and Biology, supra note 5; Owen D. Jones, Time-
Shfted Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral
Biology, 95 Nw. U.L. REv. 1141 (2001) [hereinafter Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality]. The
discussion here expands and improves on my previous uses of the metaphor.
12. I subscribe to the view of the famous physicist, Leon Lederman, that if a basic idea is too
complicated to fit on a T-shirt, it is probably wrong. TIMOTHY FERRiS, THE WHOLE SHEBANG: THE
STATE OF THE UNIVERSE(S) REPORT 272 (1997).
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Figure 2
The Lever Model of Law
explicitly, or more often implicitly, adopting some behavioral model that
suggests that there is a meaningful connection between what the law is
about to do and the outcome we seek to achieve. What are the limitations
and advantages of this image from physics?
B. Limitations
The image of law as lever is not perfect. The metaphor has at least three
limitations worth noting. First, the use of legal tools to accomplish some
change in human behavior is, itself, an instance of human behavior. So
there is some inherent dualism. This shortcoming does little harm, in itself,
provided we remember that the behavioral model illuminating how and
why people will respond to changes in incentives also illuminates how and
why people in positions to influence the use of the machinery of law will
themselves behave and how they will prefer that other people behave.
Second, we do not always know much about the contours of the
landscape of behavioral possibilities into which the behavior may roll. That
is, the image of law as lever affords little sense of how the surrounding
landscape-the existing features of a person's environment-may affect
behavioral moves. Is there some environmental feature, such as religion or
[Vol. 53
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some other cultural proscription, that is analogous to the slope of the
landscape? Is the behavior currently resting at the top of a behavioral hill,
suggesting easy movement in a variety of directions? Or is the behavior at
rest at the bottom of a behavioral valley, suggesting only a Sissyphean
future for legal interventions? Poverty, for example, may impose limits on
the behavioral landscape. For tax incentives designed to encourage
donations to charity will have less effect on poor people than rich ones.
Discrimination, also, may impose limits. For incentives intended to
encourage minority youths to attend college will have less effect if an
environment of pervasive discrimination dampens the hopes of youths that
they may ultimately achieve employment in preferred occupations. The
existence ofthese sorts of constraints, among others, which are external to
individuals and which vary among individuals and groups, suggests that in
suitable cases my metaphor would need supplementation with and
elaboration of features (such as local inclines) beyond law, behavior, and
behavioral model.
As a third limitation, the image of lever, fulcrum, and movable object
risks some confusion by inadequately conveying the full variety of human
behaviors to which this image can apply. For example, when we think of
law intervening to "move" behavior, the examples that come first to mind
are from criminal law. For instance, if we want people not to rob, we
establish penalties for doing so, in hopes of preventing behavior that might
otherwise occur. But the image of the lever of law, as presented here, is
intended to extend beyond criminal behaviors to all behaviors we try to
change with law, from Securities and Exchange Commission filings, to the
division of marital property upon divorce, to respecting the constitutional
rights of others, to litigation practices, to compliance with regulations of
our many administrative agencies. For in each case, the way we attempt to
inspire behavioral changes with the tools of law depends on our
understanding ofhowpeople will perceive legal changes and how they will
respond. And this depends, in turn, on the behavioral model that happens
to inform our thinking at the time.
C. Strengths
Despite these limitations, which strike me as neither irrelevant nor
insurmountable, the image of law as lever displays at least four important
advantages. First, and at the most general level, the image of law as lever
reminds us that all law is intervention, because the purpose of deploying
law's tools, in their wide variety, is always to achieve some result that we
believe would not happen all by itself. 3 We have been inclined to think
13. This remains true, of course, whether legal policy-makers intend to enforce the law, or
merely to express it in away that may render it self-enforcing, by virtue of what it signals to people
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that law intervenes when it changes incentives instrumentally (as when
establishing penalties for crimes), and that law does something else when
it either balances competing rights (as when it weighs the right to free
speech against the right to be free from sexual harassment), establishes
efficient regularities (as when it designates the side of the road on which
people must drive), or dispenses justice (as when providing equitable
remedies). But these very different functions of law are best viewed as
varying in degree, not in kind. For while the purpose of the intervention
differs, as does the willingness of the governed to seek intervention, and
as do the legal mechanisms deployed, there can be little doubt that law is
always intended to alter the world-in ways large or small, but always in
ways we deem unlikely to arise on their own.
Second, and relatedly, the law as lever metaphor reminds us that the
success of law's intervention always depends on subsequent,
corresponding human action. For law is impotent, but for the effects it
inspires in individual humans. Some legal policies are specifically intended
to change human behavior (e.g., to reduce the incidence of robbery) while
others are intended to achieve a wholly dissimilar result (e.g., safe drinking
water). In all cases, however, law's only physical manifestation is through
the actions of human beings. As a clarifying reminder, we do not secure
safe drinking water by passing laws that chemicals shall not pollute
groundwater, nor do we protect wildlife by passing laws that species shall
not go extinct. We pass laws to alter human behavior in ways that will help
to achieve desired outcomes, whether the change in behavior was (as in the
robbery case) the target of law or not. We threaten an undesirable outcome
or promise a desirable one. But no matter what we want to achieve with
legal policy, we achieve it only by changing human behavior. Thus,
regardless of desired outcome, every statute, every regulation, and every
judicial decision must, to be effective, move the behavior of individuals-
alone or in populations-along some path or at some speed that it would
not travel if left alone. And it is this necessity that must ultimately focus
the attention of legal policy-makers on the design and operation of the
human brain.
Third, the image of law as lever encourages us to think meaningfully
about the resistance of behavior to the efforts of law. To extend the
metaphor, behavior left alone and uninfluenced by law may have an
inertia-a comfortable resting-that requires some quantum of effort to
shift. The law as lever image both clarifies and accommodates the fact that
some behaviors will be more difficult to shift than others. These
differences in the resistance of various behaviors can be graphically
about the norms of those around them. On this "expressive function of law," see generally Richard
H. McAdams, The Legal Construction of Norms: A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA.
L. REv. 1649 (2000).
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captured with different shapes. For instance, a sphere represents a behavior
easily moved. A flat slab represents a behavior moved only with great
difficulty. And intermediate shapes represent intermediate difficulty. 4
Moreover, the existence of multiple but discrete equilibria for some kind
of behaviors, amenable to study with the tools of game theory, can be
captured by polygonic shapes. This enables a simple visual representation
of the often overlooked phenomenon that a behavior, shifted in a given
direction, may not be equally stable at all possible points. Once moved
from a point of stability, it will continue to rotate until the next stable
position, which may be as far as legal policymakers hoped, less far, or too
far. Figure 3 illustrates.
Fourth, and most importantly for present purposes, the image of law as
lever highlights what is in fact generally and unfortunately ignored: the
necessary existence and critical importance of a robust behavioral model
fulcrum. Historically, we have concentrated our attentions on the tools of
law and the resultant outcomes. We tend to think of the tools of law as
carrots and sticks, that lure or threaten. But the law as lever metaphor
better captures the idea that behavioral outcomes are necessarily mediated
through a corporeal brain, the functions of which we are always attempting
to estimate with a behavioral model, whether we are self-conscious of this
or not. And, just as a lever's efficiency is dependent on a solid fulcrum,
law's efficiency is dependent on a solid (that is, accurate and robust)
behavioral model. For law can be no more effective than the solidity that
its fulcrum affords. Thus, the law as lever metaphor starkly clarifies that
efforts to improve the effectiveness of law inevitably require efforts to
improve the behavioral models on which law relies.
D. Building Solid Fulcra
The law as lever metaphor, like all metaphors, is imperfect. I do not
think it should be pushed too far. But it is nonetheless importantly useful,
if only to focus our attention on an otherwise overlooked feature: the
dependence of law on sound behavioral models.
14. Of course, the difficulty could be represented by variations in mass, instead of shape. But
mass is less visually accessible. Note that the resistance law encounters when moving various
behaviors is analogous to, in economic terms, the elasticity of the demand curves for those
behaviors.
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Figure 3
The Lever Model of Law
Where do these behavioral models come from? As legal thinkers
attempt to design effective methods for achieving goals that have
percolated through the layers of our democratic society, they may rely on
widely-shared but typically unexamined assumptions about how people
will respond as law changes. Or they may rely on behavioral insights
offered up by other disciplines, installing and replacing these in endless
sequence according to the most unsystematic and impressionistic of
criteria. When they do so, legal thinkers tend to display a glaringly
obvious, though rarely acknowledged, over-reliance on social science
sources of information about human behavior. Our rapt attention to these
sources, perhaps reflecting the distribution of disciplinary backgrounds
among legal policy-makers, is often useful. But our virtually exclusive and
blinkered reliance upon them is importantly limited.
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Here's why: 1) constructing a sound behavioral model to serve as the
fulcrum of law depends on the depth of our understanding of behavioral
phenomena generally; 2) all theories of behavior are ultimately theories
about the brain; 3) the brain's design, function, and behavioral output are
all products ofgene-environment interactions; and 4) social sciences attend
only to the environmental half of this genes-environment interaction. To
put the magnitude of this oversight in perspective, this is like trying to
understand the phenomenon of lemonade by studying only the sugar
component, or trying to calculate the area of a rectangle by measuring
length, but not width.
Put another way, any robust behavioral model includes not only a
rigorous understanding of the environmental influences on behavior, but
also a rigorous understanding of the species-typical genetic influences on
behavior, as a result of ever-present evolutionary processes. Studying
either environmental influences or species-typical genetic influences to the
exclusion of the other is necessarily both incomplete and obsolete.
Environmental determinism is as incoherent as would be genetic
determinism. More accurate and robust behavioral models inevitably
require integrating social science insights about behavior with insights of
the life sciences, such as behavioral biology, into a seamless whole lacking
internal, cross-disciplinary inconsistencies, such as those that now often
exist.
IV. THE FORM OF LAW
To this point, we have considered the role behavioral biology plays in
developing and enhancing a sense of law's function, pursuant to the
ultimate goal of developing a proprioceptive sense of law. Proprioception
also requires, as mentioned earlier, a clear sense of form. Gaining a
proprioceptive sense of law therefore requires a close examination of the
form of law. One useful way to consider law's form is to think of law in
engineering terms. That is, we can step back and re-examine the
architectural structure of law, paying particular attention to the constraints
of both process and design space under which legal regimes are
constructed.
As a preliminary exercise, the utility of which justifies a short
digression, briefly consider the six different wineglasses in Figure 4. Most
people challenged to describe or to reproduce the variations in the forms
of the wineglasses can make a serviceable attempt. Importantly, however,
that attempt generally depends on a holistic estimate of the various
wineglass forms that is impressionistic, unsystematic, and based primarily
on attention to the black space-the silhouette of the glasses themselves.




Used with permission. By Zeke Berman © Exploratorium, www.exploratorium.edu.
Now look at Figure 4 again, focusing on the inverse image-the white
space that surrounds the black. Focusing on the non-wineglass design
space not only reveals something about that space, it also reveals
something wholly different and important about the contours ofthe glasses
themselves. By focusing on the non-wineglass design space one
immediately discerns a new coherence, a single organizing principle, and
a new understandability to the contours of the glasses. That is, the contour
of each glass outlines a different human head, in profile and mirror image.
This inverse perspective interrelates the various crenelations of each glass.
It provides thematic consonance among the wineglasses and reveals
similarities and differences among the wineglass features that one would
be far less capable of noticing or describing absent attention to the non-
glass space.
In similar fashion, I believe, examining the empty design space around
existing law can provide a new and different sense of the structure and
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form of law, in furtherance of a usefully proprioceptive sense. I will refer
to this empty design space as "non-law" or "inverse law."'" And my
argument is this: to have the clearest proprioceptive sense of where law is,
and where it may be going at any time, it is very important to have a clear
sense of where law isn't, and why. As with the wineglasses, discovering
any patterns in non-law will make the patterns in law more easily
discernible. Thus, an essential principle of a theory of non-law is this: to
understand the law we have, we must more rigorously consider why we
don't have the law we don't have. 6
A- Design Space and Decision Trees
Why don't we have the law we don't have? This is not a question one
sees frequently addressed in today's panoply of law reviews. But a fair
extrapolation from existing scholarship on contemporary legal systems
suggests that the body of law a culture displays is typically considered to
reflect a complex amalgam of culture-specific norms, culture-specific
religions, culture-specific morals, culture-specific politics, and general
economic efficiencies. One might therefore conclude that the laws we do
not have are largely path-dependent non-products of cultural
developments, no less arbitrary than the cultural variations themselves. But
I think there is far more to it than this. And I think that a study of non-law,
in light of what behavioral biology reveals about the effects of evolutionary
processes on human brain design, can illuminate it.
The temptation, when beginning to think about law and non-law, as
with any x and non-x, is to polarize them into the dichotomies we seem to
love so well. Thus the sequence: Nature & Nurture; Right & Wrong; Good
& Bad; For & Against; Law & Non-Law. Such dichotomizing is
15. The term "non-law" is not novel, although I believe that the way I use it here is. Natural
law theorists have used "non-law" as a synonym for"illegitimate law," which encompasses any law
without moral foundation. See, e.g.,Neil MacCormick, NaturalLaw andthe Separation ofLaw and
Morals, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 105-10 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).
That notion is often attributed to St. Thomas Aquinas. Norman Kretzmann, Lex Iniusta Non Est
Lex: Laws on Trial in Aquinas' Court of Conscience, 33 AM. J. JURIS. 99, 99-106 (1988).
Positivists have used "non-law" adjectivally, to refer to non-legal sources of influence on legal
decisions, such as an adjudicator's moral sense. See generally Brian Bix, On the Dividing Line
Between Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1613 (2000);
Frederick Schauer& VirginiaJ. Wise, LegalPositivism as LegalInformation, 82 CORNELLL. REV.
1080 (1997). I am not using the term in eitherof these senses. Nor am I referring to "alternate" law,
in the way that currently fashionable "alternate history" explores different histories thatwould have
transpired but for some historical event (such as Hitler losing the war).
16. This reasoning, though unfamiliar, should be uncontroversial. It is akin to suggesting that
in order to understand the necessary conditions of life, it is useful to study not only the
environments in which life thrives, but also those in which it does not. Sometimes only the absence
of some feature makes the necessity of that feature obvious.
HeinOnline  -- 53 Fla. L. Rev. 849 2001
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW
misleading, of course, for at least three reasons. First, it tends falsely to
separate things that are inseparably intertwined, such as nature and nurture.
Second, it polarizes things, such as right and wrong, that are often best
considered as endpoints of a continuum. Third, and most importantly, such
dichotomizing often creates the illusion of symmetry and balance,
suggesting, perhaps, that the relationship between law and non-law is
meaningfully similar to the relationship between yin and yang. This is, of
course, often wholly inconsistent with the facts, as the engineering
perspective on design space makes clear. The design space available for an
opposite ofa thing (or anon-thing) totally overwhelms the design space for
the thing itself And an important initial step in exploring non-law is
therefore to let go of any intuition of symmetry, complementarity, or even
proportionality.
To begin to consider more systematically the overall design space of
law (or, put another way, the set of all possible legal variations), it strikes
me that we might usefully divide matters this way. The design space for
the body of law can be represented (and simplified) as an extensive
decision tree consisting of four principal elements: Topics, Content, Tools,
and Effort. These four elements can be defined as follows. Topics is the set
of all the general subjects we might conceivably care about. Content
reflects the full variety of normative preferences for how we might care
about those things. Tools is a set that includes all the methods available to
legal thinkers by which we might attempt to effect positive change, in
order to bring reality into line with our normative preferences. And Effort
reflects all potential variations in how hard it may be to effect such change
using any particular tool of law. See Figure 5.
Figure 5
Topics: The set of all possible subject matters that we
could potentially care about.
Content: The set of all possible normative preferences
(goals) regarding each subject matter.
Tools: The set of all possible legal methods by which
we might attempt to achieve those goals.
Effort: The set of all possible variations in the amount
of effort necessary to achieve the goals using a
particular method.
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To clarify, Topics-which includes everything from violence to
silverware patterns-is clearly the most diverse element, encompassing all
potential subject matter within the human experience. Content, which
reflects our attitude about behaviors relevant to each Topic, may vary
along a spectrum from pro to neutral to con, indicating our normative
preference to have more or less-or at least standardized-behavior.
Preferences may arise from, among other things, our moral judgments,
religious prescriptions, emotional realities, and sense of economic
efficiencies. (For example, we may conclude that theft is bad, not good;
false imprisonment is bad, not good; and slander and libel are bad, not
good.) Tools for altering behavior come in many promising and
unpromising forms, from tax incentives, regulation, and incarceration to
those myriad things law might undertake to no effect whatsoever. And
Effort spans the spectrum from trivially easy to insurmountably difficult.
These four elements of the design space fit together in a particular,
chronological way. A simplified illustration of a small fraction of the
overall design space just described appears as Figure 6. For purposes of the
figure, the Content, Tools, and Effort components of merely four possible
Topics are each considered susceptible of only three alternatives,
represented by branches (in reality, of course, there are many more
possibilities than the figure describes). As each of these four principal
elements is represented horizontally in a vertical hierarchy, I will in what
follows sometimes refer to each element as a "level" of that decision tree.
A moment's reflection demonstrates that every legal system, at every
moment, looks more like Figure 7 than Figure 6. Solid lines in Figure 7
indicate features of the legal system. Dotted lines indicate non-law. That
is, there are some topics we care about and many we do not. And, for each
topic we care about, the legal system tends to reflect, in its content, one
normative preference (or relatively narrow set of preferences) rather than
others, and one or more types of tools, from among many, with each tool
confronting an effort-a degree of difficulty corresponding to resistance-
appropriate to the topic-specific disjunction between normatively preferred
behavior and existing behavior.
Viewed from this perspective, the overall design space of law is, like
the galaxy, more interstitial emptiness than substance. And rather than
painting a vision of Law's Empire, stretching from horizon to horizon,
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after the famous image of Ronald Dworkin's,"' what we see instead is a
graphic illustration oflaw's delicate, crenellated, lace-like filigree, floating
wispily within a massive design space, mostly unused.
What bears explaining, then, is not only why the law is the way it is, but
why it isn't more like the many other ways it could have been. Although
this latter question is related to the first, it is nonetheless analytically
separate. Its principal utility is that it directs our attention to probability.
What is the prior probability that a legal system would ultimately reflect
the specific form it has taken, manifested by the features it actually
displays, from among the nearly infinite possible combinations of topics,
content, tools, and effort? We already know that there are some obvious
constraints-political, cultural, economic, and even geographic-on
probability. But as we attempt to sharpen our deep-structure,
proprioceptive sense of the form of law, we must ask whether there are
other forces at work, as yet unstudied, that can help us to better understand
patterns and probabilities in non-law, and thus to better discern the patterns
in law itself. I believe that there are such forces at work, and that
behavioral biology is one of several disciplines that can help to reveal
them.
B. Non-Law
Before turning to consider that, however, I must first elaborate on the
approach just described. This requires the brief presentation of several
additional definitions, necessary to the discussions that follow.
In my view, there are a variety of different components to non-law that
intersect the four major elements of the overall design space mentioned in
the last section. I will call these components of non-law pointless law,
needless law, toothless law, and useless law. See Figure 8. Each of these
components operates to effectively prune and remove various branches
from the decision tree of law's design space. They do not, thereby, make
each resultant legal regime inevitable. But by incrementally and
consistently constraining the design space, they do inevitably make
resultant legal features somewhat more probable than they were
previously.
Pointless law describes the set of all possible legal features that could
address things we do not care about. We consider there to be no point to
such legal intervention. Pointless law therefore prunes otherwise possible
legal features from the Topics level of the decision tree. It separates those
topics as to which other people's behaviors tend not to materially interest
us, such as their house-cleaning and file-cabinet organization methods,
from those topics as to which other people's behaviors indeed affect us,
such as topics relating to safety, property, and family.
17. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
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Needless law describes the set of all possible legal features that could
address topics we do care about, but as to which existing behaviors already
tend, even in the absence of legal intervention, to match our normative
preferences. We consider there to be no need for such legal intervention.
Needless law therefore prunes otherwise possible legal features from the
Content level of the decision tree. It separates those normative preferences
that align with existing behavior, such as the preference for people to
engage in trade, from those that do not, such as the preference that people
not engage in robbery or fraud.18 The existence of needless law depends on
the fact that some beneficial features ofmodem society are self-generating
and self-organizing, despite the absence of(or even due to the absence of)
top-down behavioral proscriptions.
Toothless law describes the set of all the possible legal methods for
attempting change, in an effort to bring behavior on certain topics into line
with our normative preferences, that are wholly unpromising. We do not,
for example, threaten a transgressor with a meticulously compiled but
confidential tally of transgressions. We consider there to be no teeth (or
bite) to such possible techniques of legal intervention. Toothless law
therefore prunes otherwise possible legal features from the Tools level of
the decision tree. It separates those methods that are more effective from
those that are less effective or ineffective.
Useless law describes the set of all possible legal features that could
address things we care about, and as to which behaviors do not already
match our normative preferences, but as to which we are virtually
powerless to effect change with the methods of law. We consider there to
be no use to such legal intervention. Useless law therefore prunes
otherwise possible legal features from the Effort level of the decision tree.
It separates legal interventions that would require less effort from those
that would either require extraordinary effort, or as to which even
extraordinary effort is likely to be ineffective. For example, consider that
no statute requiring an adult, in a situation of peril to a group of children,
to save the most economically promising or socially useful children before
his or her own would have much effect-regardless of the legal
consequences for failure to do so, and even assuming that the statutorily
preferred children were immediately recognizable.
I submit that there are three ultimate points to this non-law approach.
First, the entire body of law, large as it is, is but a fraction of what the body
of law might be. Second, that fraction is defined, in part, by the silhouette
of what we either will not, need not, or cannot do. Third, that what we will
not, need not, and cannot do is both common, in its major features, to
18. The fact that there may be no need to force people to engage in a behavior, such as trade,
does not mean, of course, that there are no benefits to facilitating such behaviors through legal
methods. But that is a separate matter.
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people around the world, and non-randomly generated by the functional
design of the human brain.
C. Biolegal History
The design space of law, just described, consists of four principal
elements or levels: Topics, Content, Tools, and Effort. Because no legal
system could simultaneously reflect all possible law, each element must be
winnowed, in a process that separates law from non-law. Consistent with
my suggestion that there is something meaningful to be learned about law
from the study of non-law, I have proposed recognizing at least four
general categories of non-law, each corresponding to one of the four
principal elements. Comprising those categories are aspects of legal
regimes that are pointless, needless, toothless, and useless.9
At this point, I propose that one way in which behavioral biology may
help us to identify patterns in non-law, and thus in law, is to help us see
patterns in these four categories of non-law. There are three things to note,
preliminarily. First, note that I am not claiming that patterns in existing law
are not also directly susceptible of identification with methods of
evolutionary analysis, applied directly. They are. I am instead claiming that
it may be easier to see some of the patterns (as with the wineglasses) by
focusing first on the inverse image of non-law. Second, note that I am not
claiming that the distinction between law and non-law is incapable of
being clarified from the perspectives of, among other things, economics,
sociology, and the like. It has been. I am instead claiming that it is also
historically accurate and parsimonious to explain some aspects of that
distinction with reference to behavioral biology. And I focus attention
there, in part, because it provides a new perspective, capable of offering
new insights. Third, note that I am not speaking, of course, about self-
evident biology, or what we might call "First Order Effects" of biology on
law, such as law's taking account of the human need for air, food, and
sleep, or dealing with the fact that people can in fact be biologically
poisoned by chemicals or wounded by speeding projectiles. I am speaking,
instead, of "Second Order Effects" of biology on law: the effects of
evolved neural algorithms on such law-relevant features of human
experience as patterns in emotions, resource acquisition, mating, status
competitions, moralistic aggression, and the like. Let me explore this
approach a bit further, providing a brief overview that may sketch the
general contours of the idea.
19. I do not mean to suggest that these four categories comprise all of non-law. Doubtless,
there are others. For example, some potential tools of law (such as torture) may be excluded not
because they are ineffective, but because their use would be shocking to the conscience.
20011
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What I am trying to convey is the idea that one can see evolutionary
influences in law just as one can see evolutionary influences in organisms
generally.2" True, we have already grown accustomed to the idea that law
"evolves," and that, for example, inefficient rules are more selectively
relitigated than efficient ones." But this common reference to the role of
evolution in law is analogical. And it is a different use of evolutionary
reasoning than I intend here. I am arguing, in contrast, that many features
of law are results of the ways in which evolutionary processes built the
human brain. Thus, these legal features have not arisen solely because of
cultural and economic processes that are like biological evolution (though
those processes obviously have strong influence), they have arisen in
material part because of processes that are biological evolution. To say this
another way, the legal features of any legal system will reflect not only the
sifting and sorting of social and economic processes that lead to legal
change, but will also reflect specific features of evolved, species-typical,
human brain design. What I am suggesting is, in effect, the possibility of
developing a broad and systematic bio-legal history.22
What this perspective leads to is a subtle but important reorientation of
the way we think about law. A comparison may make this clear. When we
think of the way evolutionary processes yield species, it is common to refer
to this as a process of design. And yet we know that, in reality,
evolutionary processes do not create or design. They relentlessly strip away
heritable traits that contribute less toward reproductive success than do
contemporaneously existing alternative traits. This makes what was left
behind look as if it has been designed. In the same way, evolutionary
processes, through their influence on human brain design, have not so
much built law as they have stripped away a great deal of possible features
of legal systems. That is, a great deal of what we consider to be pointless,
needless, toothless, and useless has been effectively foreclosed by the
historical biological pathways that have left the brain designed as it is. This
is not to say that the human brain, or its features, was inevitable. But it is
to say that the brain and its features inevitably reflect evolutionary
processes. It is also not to say that humans, as a uniquely analytic species,
20. For additional arguments on this subject, see sources cited supra note 4.
21. See generally Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 641 (1996); Jeffrey Stake, Status and Incentive Aspects of Judicial Decisions, 79 GEO. L.J.
1447, 1477-93 (1991); E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition inJurisprudence, 85 COLUM.
L. REv. 38 (1985); Paul H. Rubin, Whyls the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977).
22. Margo Wilson and Martin Daly, for example, have made some intriguing and instructive
steps in this direction, in the context of family law. See, e.g., Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, The
Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Chattel, in THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 289 (Jerome H. Barkow, et al., eds. 1992); Margo Wilson,
Impact of the Uncertainty of Paternity on Family Law, 45 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 217, 223
(1987).
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are incapable of affirmatively building and creating and designing legal
features. They do all of those things. But it is to say that these legal
features exist within the somewhat flexible but nonetheless constraining
boundaries that biological evolution has wrought. And it is to say that any
assumption that law reflects only social, political, religious, and economic
developments is both overly narrow and archaic.
D. Behavioral Biology and the Form of Law
Consider the Topics level of the decision tree. The pointless law
component of non-law traces the contour between topics that evolutionary
processes have left the brain designed to care about and those that it has
not. Behavioral biology reveals a pattern in non-law that helps us look at
the pattern in law topics in a new way. We can consider that the origins of
the major features of law were not so much affirmatively constructed by
humanity, as they were revealed as what was left over after the non-law
was stripped away. As a result, the main topics and subject matters of law
parallel, rather remarkably, the main features of evolved human brain
functioning that science is gradually uncovering. By way of partial
illustration, see Figure 9. Given the species-typical and finite capacities of
our brains, we tend (on average, of course) not to care as much about
things that were irrelevant in evolutionary history as we care about things
that were relevant. For instance, for reasons that cannot be completely
understood without a biobehavioral perspective, we care about resources:
acquiring resources, holding resources, and using resources. Whence, in
part, the law of Property. Similarly, we care about increasing our resources
through beneficial exchange. Whence, in part, the law of Contracts. We
seek to be secure in both our property and in our bodies. Whence, in part,
Criminal Law and Tort Law. We seek mating autonomy and essential
reproductive autonomy. Whence, in part, Family Law.
True, one could tell a story that these features of many legal systems
were created solely from the conscious mind of humankind, as if some
ancestral human invented the idea of property, or the idea of exchange. But
one would be wrong. And while it is obviously true that some features of
a legal system (such as Entertainment Law, for example) are much farther
from biological influence than others, it is also true that a wide variety of
the other main areas of law, such as Employment Law, Business Law,
Environmental Law, Intellectual Property Law, International Law,
Consumer Law, and the like, can easily be seen as epiphenomenal to the
basic legal curriculum-a curriculum that is basic, in part, because of the
way it maps onto the fundamental, evolved, human needs and desires. To
put it bluntly, the main topics of law reflect the main features of the
evolved human psychology.







4 c d V uc





HeinOnline  -- 53 Fla. L. Rev. 860 2001
DUNWODYDISTINGUISHED LEC2T.REINLAW
Consider the Content level. As with pointless law, the needless law
component of non-law ultimately reveals a pattern in law. Behavioral
biology helps to connect norms, preferences, moral foundations, and
emotions.' Those predispositions that were needless were, by and large,
stripped away-particularly when they yielded behavior that imposed net
costs to organisms bearing them. The biobehavioral perspective ultimately
provides explanation for why the directionality of most major norms and
preferences is so remarkably non-random across human populations. The
directionality reflects not only culture, but also the way in which
evolutionary processes built the human brain to care about things that had
important effects on reproductive success in ancestral environments. If one
of the main insights of the economic approach to law was to redescribe
legal sanctions as prices, then one of the main insights of behavioral
biology is to redescribe emotions as evolved information-processing
pathways that tend to create internal states of the nervous system that
tended, in turn, to yield behaviors that were adaptive in the environment
of evolutionary adaptation.24 Am I saying that emotions are preference-
forming, behavior-biasing algorithms, resulting from evolutionary
processes? Of course I am." Emotions are also more than that, of course.
But no comprehensive thinking about emotions can be complete without
the perspective that behavioral biology affords.26
This leads me to one hypothesis central to any biolegal history: that the
normative content of legal systems will, all over the globe, tend to reflect
the behavioral biology of species-typical emotions, even as the details of
23. This point is explored in Owen D. Jones, On the Nature ofNorms: Biology, Morality, and
the Disruption of Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2072 (2000) [hereinafter Jones, On the Nature of
Norms].
24. This is not, of course, to suggest that the emotions always or even generally yield adaptive
behaviors inpresentenvironments. Potential mismatch between evolved psychological mechanisms
and novel features of current environments, what I refer to as time-shifted rationality, is explored
in Jones, Time-Shijfted Rationality, supra note 11.
25. For more on this point, see Owen D. Jones, Law, Emotions, and Behavioral Biology, 39
JURIMErRCS J. 283, 288 (1999).
26. There are three different ways that the nervous system (of which the brain is the principal
component) can bias behavior. First, it can bias behavior autonomically, for those non-optional,
necessary functions that ensure breathing, heart pumping, reflexive recoil from dangerous
conditions like extreme heat, and the like. Second, it can bias behavior through emotions, which
are, in essence, preference-forming algorithms-heuristics and shortcuts to historically adaptive
behavior. Third, it can bias behavior through procedurally rational calculation, reflection,
deliberation, and analysis.
Although we tend to consider these three avenues of behavior generation to be categorically
distinct, from abiological perspective these exist on acontinuum. They simply correlate the amount
of discretion an organism has to the severity of the environmental conditions, and the extremity of
consequences for inappropriate behavior. Thus, for example, we have no capacity to stop our own
hearts through force of decision, little capacity to ignore infidelities of our sex partners, and rather
generous capacity to decide between voting democrat or republican.
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those legal systems will inevitably vary in many particulars. This is a
strong claim. To clarify, I am not suggesting that all legal systems will be
identical. There is ample room for cultural variation, random variation, and
historical accident. What I am suggesting is that evolutionary processes
have operated much like a gravitational force, so that the design even of
legal systems that vary can be coherently analyzed in light of that force,
just as the varying designs of fish, mammals, and birds are nonetheless all
fully consistent with the operating constraints of gravity. That is, the main
features of different legal systems will be intelligible in light of behavioral
biology in the same way that the features of the world's flora and fauna are
intelligible in light of gravity.
Two brief examples. First, this perspective predicts that almost
everywhere crimes of passion will generally be treated differently than
premeditated crimes. This is expected to reflect a shared sense of how the
reasonable person behaves, consistent with each person's projection onto
others of his or her own subjective experience of grappling with powerful
behavior-influencing emotions (such asjealousy, anger, and panic) that are
less easily controlled than are many other behavior-influencing
phenomena. Relatedly, this perspective also suggests that there is a
biobehavioral underpinning not only to the history of law's treatment of
so-called crimes of passion, but also to the entire legal notion of the
"reasonable person" in the United States, which I suggest largely codifies
our implicit understanding of evolved, species-typical psychology. 7
Second, this perspective predicts that virtually nowhere will law treat
forced copulation as inconsequential, or as a minor physical injury. We
would not, of course, expect that random cultural variation would
consistently yield the circumstance, all over the globe, that forced
copulation is a uniquely heinous offense. We would, however, expect such
homogeneity from a biobehavioral perspective. As a consequence of the
evolutionary significance of lost mate choice to females in internally
fertilizing species, natural selection would favor with widespread
distribution any heritable psychological predisposition toward extreme
revulsion at either being raped or having female relatives or intimates
raped.
28
27. It also offers, incidentally, both theoretical and empirical support for the notion that there
will be some limited contexts in which the reasonable man and the reasonable woman will differ.
See generally DAVID C. GEARY, MALE, FEMALE: THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SEX DIFFERENCES
(1998); BOBBI S. Low, WHY SEX MATrERS: A DARWINIAN LOOK AT HUMAN BEHAVIOR (2000);
LINDA MEALEY, SEX DIFFERENCES: DEVELOPMENTAL AND EVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES (2000); and
sources cited supra note 4.
28. This prediction appears to be strongly supported by the patterns of sexual aggression in
all the many species, including humans, in which forced copulation occurs. For an overview of
these, and other matters concerning biological influences on patterns of sexual aggression, see
generally Jones, Biology of Rape, supra note 3; Owen D. Jones, Realities of Rape: OfScience and
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Consider the Tools level of the decision tree. The toothless law
component of non-law strips away much of what will not work. And what
will not work would fail, in part, because of the biological underpinnings
of human brains. If it were anywhere obvious where law and behavioral
biology meet, it would be in the methods we use to push or lure people into
behaving differently. We consider these tools so obvious, today, that it is
at first difficult to consider the non-law design space for tools of law. It is
vast. And yet we are accustomed to the idea that if you want to get
someone to behave differently, one of the best ways to do this is to provide
economic incentives. People can be financially rewarded for doing things
we like. For example, we can offer rewards for information leading to
convictions, or offer tax breaks for donations to particular causes, rather
than others. Or we can financially penalize those who behave in ways we
do not like-by imposing fines on environmental transgressors, for
example, or imposing punitive damages on the grossly negligent. Another
way to deter bad behavior is through incarceration.
But notice how, whether through financial mechanisms or jail time
(which also imposes the financial costs of foregone income), we have
settled on methods that are coherent from a biological perspective. We
avoid those things that organisms have not evolved to care about, and
instead target and restrict precisely those things human beings are designed
to care about most. Civil fines impede the acquisition and free use of
resources. Criminal penalties limit physical freedoms, coalitional and
political (associational) freedom, access to children and other relatives,
reputation and status, and sexual opportunity. At times of imposed
isolation, criminal penalties even deny social, physical, and emotional
access to any other human being at all. The contours of these aspects of
legal tools can be clarified in light of non-law because the overwhelming
number of things we do not attempt, in order to influence human behavior,
so neatly reflect the commonality of human brain functioning, the shared
strength of feelings people have about these particular activities, and the
near inevitability that legal tools would ultimately center on these handful
of activities of paramount importance to the evolved human brain. We
would never expect that the average person would react as strongly to the
removal of other aspects from among life's riches, such as a particular
sport, music, or leather recliner, as they would to the restriction of these
central elements. And the seeming triviality of this observation, when one
thinks only of America, is powerfully belied by this: this perspective, and
not others, predicts that these same tools will be central features of legal
systems in virtually every human culture, all over the globe, at all recent
times, whether those cultures had previous contact with one another or not.
Politics, Causes and Meanings, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1386 (2001).
2001]
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Finally, consider the Effort level. The useless law component of non-
law ultimately highlights patterns in human behavioral resistance. An
understanding of how evolutionary processes affect human behavioral
predispositions subsequently leads, as I have elsewhere argued, to a theory
of human resistance to legal intervention.29 That theory has, at its core, a
principal I have termed "The Law of Law's Leverage," '3 which provides
some general guidance into predicting the comparative slopes of the
demand curves for various behaviors we seek to influence with the tools
of law.31
Here is what I mean. From the valuable insights of economics, we
already know that, as a general rule, the demand for any given behavior
will tend to decrease as the cost of that behavior increases. See Figure 10.
For example, we typically expect that there will be fewer incidents of
robbery as the number of years injail one receives for a robbery conviction
increases (holding constant the probability of apprehension). But at present
we have precious little guidance, other than intuition and empirical
experience (trial and error), for understanding the mathematical
relationship between increased penalties and decreased robbery. That is,
by how much will we have to increase penalties in order to achieve an x%
reduction in robbery? Similarly, how will the relationship between
penalties and robbery compare to the relationship between penalties and
drug abuse, on one hand, and jaywalking, on the other? The answers to
these questions depend on the slopes of the demand curves for these
different behaviors, which we have no reason to believe are identical. See
Figure 11.
Yet, and this bears emphasis, we simply have no systematic theory for
anticipating the relative steepness of the slopes of demand curves for
different behaviors. This is borne out, for example, in the obvious
puzzlement legal and economic thinkers encounter in deterring a
statistically common form of homicide: homicides consequent to
seemingly trivial altercations, such as obscene hand gestures.32 Surely, we
29. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality, supra note 11.
30. See id. Part IV; see also Jones, On the Nature ofNorms, supra note 23, at 2100-01.
31. I will adopt the common but imprecise convention of using variations in slope to capture
the idea of variations in elasticity by, for example, describing inelastic demand with a steeply sloped
demand curve. Technically, the elasticity of a demand curve, and the curve's slope, are not the
same. Slope depends on the rate of change in price and quantity, while elasticity depends on
percentage changes. On every straight-line demand curve, elasticity varies from infinity, at the
vertical axis intercept when quantity demanded is zero, to zero, at the horizontal axis when price
per unit is zero. The curve below the midpoint (at which elasticity is precisely one) is therefore
inelastic while the curve above the midpoint is elastic. However, it is common to refer to the flatter
or steeper slopes as reflecting elasticity or inelasticity, respectively, because in the former case we
tend to focus on the upper half of the curve, and in the latter case on the lower half.
32. On the prevalence and patterns of trivial altercation homicide, see MARTIN DALY &
MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE 124-26 (1988).
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have a great deal of empirical evidence indicating that some behaviors,
such as these, are less easily influenced by legal interventions than others.
But we have no robust theory of why some behaviors are less easily
influenced by legal interventions.
The Law of Law's Leverage predicts that:
The magnitude oflegal intervention necessary to reduce or to
increase the incidence of any human behavior will correlate
positively or negatively, respectively, with the extent to which
a predisposition contributing to that behavior was adaptive
for its bearers, on average, in past environments.33
The biobehavioral perspective on variations in human resistance to
legal interventions helps to explain how much law we are likely to have on
a given topic, how hard we are likely to have to push to move behavior
consistent with the content of our normative preferences, and how difficult
(and, typically, expensive) it will be to move some behaviors as compared
with others. To illustrate, the biobehavioral perspective offers a systematic
reason why the slope of the demand curve for aggression following public
threats to status, such as obscene hand gestures, is generally steeper than
the curve for many other behaviors bearing similar penalties.34 Similarly,
the biobehavioral perspective offers a coherent reason why the slope of the
demand curve for manslaughter, in contexts of discovering a spouse in bed
with a lover, is comparatively more vertical (less sensitive to increases in
penalties) than is the demand curve for jaywalking (again, holding the
probability of apprehension constant).35 It helps to explain and predict why
separation and divorce rates are, in fact, so much less affected by legal
changes than we commonly think.36 Relatedly, it helps to explain why
33. The many component terms of this formulation are defined and elaborated, in greater
detail and space than this article affords, in Jones, Time-ShiftedRationality, supra note 11, Part IV.
An alternative phrasing, which puts this principle more accurately, if much more cumbersomely,
is this: the law of law's leverage states that the magnitude of legal intervention necessary to reduce
or to increase the incidence of any human behavior will correlate positively or negatively,
respectively, with the extent to which a behavior-biasing, information-processing predisposition
underlying that behavior (a) increased the inclusive fitness of those bearing the predisposition, on
average, more than it decreased it, across all those bearing the predisposition, in the environment
in which it evolved and (b) increased the inclusive fitness of those bearing the predisposition more,
on average, than did any other alternative predisposition that happened to appear in the environment
during the same period.
34. See, e.g., DALY & WILSON, supra note 32.
35. See, e.g., DAvID M. BUSS, THE DANGEROUS PASSION: WHY JEALOUSY IS AS NECESSARY
AS LOVE AND SEx (2000); David M. Buss, et al., Sex Differences in Jealousy: Evolution,
Physiology, and Psychology, 3 PSYCHOL. SCI. 251 (1992).
36. For a recent study on the relative insensitivity ofdivorce rates to divorce laws, see Ira M.
Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Dissolving the Relationship Between Divorce Laws andDivorce Rates, 18
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certain non-market behavior is, in fact, non-market behavior rather than
market behavior.
This biobehavioral perspective on non-law and law suggests that the
underlying architecture of law is at least as likely to be influenced by
behavioral biology as it is to be, as commonly considered, path-dependent
and socioculturally contingent, within the obvious limits of economic
efficiency. By that I mean that some law-relevant puzzles that are not
explicable in terms of efficiency or randomly arising cultural artifacts
preserved by path dependence are explicable in terms of behavioral
biology. In addition to those mentioned thus far, these include
intertemporal choice anomalies, hyperbolic discounting, inconsistent
preferences, and perhaps even endowment effects, as I have argued
separately.37 This suggests that traditional approaches to understanding law
and human behavior could benefit from supplementation with
biobehavioral perspectives.
The biobehavioral perspective on law's form also suggests that the
underlying architecture of law is likely to be common through the vast
majority of human societies. Put another way, I am arguing that this
approach provides a partial groundwork for a biolegal history-a
biobehavioral lens on worldwide legal history.38 This is considerably easier
to assert than to demonstrate. But here I am attempting only to raise the
issue, not to prove it. For the sound study of behavioral biology, including
study of the relentless effects of evolutionary processes on species-typical
patterns of predispositions, provides ample support for believing that
biolegal histories can be developed-even while there is ample room for
variation and for free will. This may prove to be a promising area for
future work.
V. SUMMARY AND ATTENDANT ISSUES
A Summary
I am attempting to show how a great number of different legal features
can be connected and usefully illuminated by an evolutionary analysis in
law. In sum, I am proposing that a proprioceptive perspective on law is
useful, and that developing it requires heightening our awareness of both
INT'L REv. L. &ECON. 341 (1988). For an overview of explanations for this, see generally HELEN
E.FISHER, ANATOMY OF LOVE: THENATURAL HISTORY OF MONOGAMY, ADULTERY, AND DIVORCE
(1992).
37. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality, supra note 11.
38. I speculated on this possibility earlier in Jones, Biology ofRape, supra note 3, at 930-33;
Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality, supra note 11, Part IV.B; Owen D. Jones, The Evolution of
Irrationality, 41 JURIMETRIcs J. 289, 317-18 (2001).
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the function and form of law. The image of law as lever, with its emphasis
on the behavioral model fulcrum, and the consequent attention to the
combined effects of both environment and genes on law-relevant brain
design, can help to heighten the awareness of function. The images of the
design space and the decision tree for law can help to heighten awareness
of the form. One of the ways to achieve this new view on the form of law,
I have suggested, is to focus on non-law, or inverse law. And one of the
ways to do that, in turn, is to think about the ways in which an evolutionary
analysis, with its biobehavioral perspective, clarifies which branches of the
decision tree have been pruned away by evolutionary processes, leaving us
with non-random patterns ofnon-law that are pointless, needless, toothless,
or useless. The crenelations in these patterns of non-law offer a greater
clarity to the patterns in law that we do have, and suggest the possibility of
developing biolegal histories for a variety of law's features. We gain a
more accurate and contextualized view of the smallness of law,
reconsidering empire as filigree. And we gain a better sense of the
probabilities that modem legal systems would exhibit the features they do,
rather than entirely different features that are supposedly more susceptible
(even infinitely susceptible) of arbitrary cultural variation.
One of the things I am suggesting, inherent in all this, is a fundamental
reorientation in the way we think about the relationship between law and
biology. At present, we in law tend to display what might be called a buffet
model mentality. See Figure 12. Law is the center of attention, in this party
we have thrown ourselves, and we reach out to sample the culinary dishes
of different disciplines, according to either our subjective interest in them,
some perceived need, or the force with which they are thrust upon us by
the chefs of each domain. In this view, biology is merely one dish among
many, functionally similar and exchangeable.
What I am proposing, instead, is that we conceptualize the relationship
between law and biology in the way indicated by the pyramidal model of
Figure 1 3.39 Biological processes are, like physical and chemical processes,
wholly and irreducibly foundational. Each of the remaining domains of
knowledge integrates with the human experience at a different, more
lateral and contemporaneous level. To be clear, I am not suggesting that
biology is somehow the Queen of all disciplines, more important or more
useful than any other. That is clearly not the case. What I am suggesting,
instead, is that the relationship between law and biology is wholly different
than the relationship between law and literature, or law and politics, or law
and sociology, or law and economics. Biological processes operate,
inexorably and unavoidably, on a vastly different time scale. And a
39. This image was inspired, in part, by conference slides developed by Timothy Goldsmith,
most recently appearing in GOLDSMITH & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 3, at 8.
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competent understanding of them requires different considerations and
methods.
The use of biology (as one discipline of several) to sharpen a
proprioceptive sense of law represents one of these methods. This raises
several issues and, lest my argument be misunderstood, the need for
several clarifications.
Figure 12










i Chemical Processes I
4oPhysical Processes
B. Issues and Clarifications
First, my argument that legal systems tend to reflect biobehavioral
predispositions says precisely nothing about whether or not they should.
That is, the approach is descriptive, and itself supplies no normative value
to behaviors or goals. What it does do, however, is provide information
that may be valuable to us as we attempt to achieve goals that have already
been set by independent processes of norm formation. To the extent that
there is a "should" resident anywhere in this, it is that: a) we should avail
ourselves of potentially useful knowledge systems if we are serious about
achieving our goals; and b) behavioral biology should be recognized as a
knowledge system useful to that enterprise.
Second, to say that legal systems will tend to reflect biobehavioral
predispositions is not to say that those predispositions will determine every
feature. But that very admission in no way grants that everything is up for
grabs and that we cannot know anything about what legal features are
likely to emerge. Evolutionary processes are complex, and so are the
humans to which they have given rise. The process of evolution includes
within it aspects of accident and randomness, at the same time that the
decidedly non-random processes of natural and sexual selection preserve
or eliminate anatomical features and behavioral predispositions that are
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heritable and have differential effects on reproductive success, no matter
how those features or predispositions have arisen.
Consequently, the constraints of evolutionary processes on human brain
design, and thence on legal system, can be very real and yet non-narrow,
at the same time. At the very least, we would expect, for example, that
environmental variations among different human populations would
contribute not only to cultural variation, but also to legal variation. To use
a simple example, populations living in particularly dry areas are likely to
have more law concerning water rights than those living in areas where the
supply of rainfall greatly exceeds the demand. Similarly, we would expect
that the analytic power of the brain that evolution has afforded us would
not be wasted in the face of entirely novel realizations and circumstances,
which could and will result in major shifts in law. The threat of global
climate change, and the possibility of international cooperation to combat
it, is an example, as is the discovery of the connection between the
ingestion of various chemicals and decreased fertility. What evolutionary
analysis does suggest, however, is that all novel circumstances will be
processed through a corporeal brain, equipped with predispositions to care
about things in certain patterned ways, such that the kinds of circumstances
that will lead to major changes in law, and to variation among legal
systems, will be consistent with the features of that evolved brain, rather
than inconsistent, and therefore amenable to a coherent understanding in
light of those evolutionary processes. For example, we may expect that
truly major changes in law may follow encounters with circumstances that
threaten health, property, resources, political coalitions, the exercise of
power, and the like, and not (except in the most attenuated hypotheticals)
with circumstances affecting color preferences, tastes in ice-cream,
penmanship, musical inclinations, and the names of household pets.
Third, the argument that behavioral biology can help to explain central
features of the architecture of law could be easily misunderstood to be
more disciplinarily imperialistic than it is in fact. It is therefore important
to remember that the predictive and explanatory power of evolutionary
analysis depends on probabilities, not certainties. This in no way renders
the analysis useless, any more than the probabilistic nature of meteorology
and seismology renders those disciplines useless. This simply means, in
the end, that while some features of most legal systems-such as their
general preoccupation with property-were very highly likely, they were
not necessarily inevitable. Nor should it be casually assumed that every
specific feature of the law is directly traceable to some adaptive feature of
the human psychology.
Fourth, the approach outlined earlier can, at best, only describe the
macroscopic features of legal systems. For example, while it may
ultimately provide a useful window into legal patterns of property,
cooperation, and conflict, it offers nothing to the question of why someone
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should have ten days to file a reply brief in one jurisdiction, and only five
days in another. Nor, to give another example, does it provide either
normative guidance or explanation concerning particular risk tolerances a
government will display, such as the amount of mercury that is legally
permissible in food for human consumption. This does not trouble me. One
need not have a theory of everything in order to explain some things. And
increasing our understanding of the constraints on and patterns of
macroscopic superstructures of legal systems is more than sufficient to
demonstrate utility of evolutionary analysis in law.
Finally, this non-law approach as yet affords no clear role to, or
descriptive explanation for, symbolic law. We know, for example, that
legal policy-makers throughout history have sometimes taken stands on the
undesirability of behavior that is excessively difficult to prevent with the
tools of law. They may do so because their intent is truly aspirational,
regardless of the unlikelihood of any state enforcement, or they may do so
because of the signaling value of moral posturing. In either case, the
phenomenon exists. Rarely enforced proscriptions against adultery come
to mind. So any model that predicts that few legal features will attend
behaviors that are extremely difficult to affect with the tools of law will
remain incomplete without making appropriate accommodation for this
obvious feature of many modem legal systems. This strikes me as an
important, though not insurmountable, shortcoming that future work may
usefully address. It may be the case that meaningful patterns in such laws
are amenable to evolutionary analysis. For example, it is possible that
many of law's symbolic stands are more a reflection of the extreme
acuteness of some evolved emotional realities (such asjealousy concerning
potential adultery), that bubble up cathartically despite comparative legal
fruitlessness, than they are a reflection of a genuine belief that symbolic
stands are materially effective in actually changing people's behavior.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have been leaping, of course, over large landscapes of detail in an
effort to provide a broad view of one possible implication of our entering
an era of broader integration of law and science. In particular, I have
attempted to reflect briefly on what the effects of brain design on human
behavior may mean for law. As we may consider the two paradoxes with
which I opened-law's lack of an independent behavioral model and the
historical disinterest in brain design-I would impress upon us three main
themes.
First, behavioral biology is essential to any firm grasp on human
behavior relevant to law. Law depends on a solid behavioral model. And
solid behavioral models must integrate social science perspectives, from
sociology, economics, and the like, with life science perspectives, such as
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those offered by behavioral biology. For it is as coherent to have a theory
of human behavior that lacks a sound biological foundation as it is to have
a theory of gymnastics lacking a sound foundation in physics. It cannot be
done. If law is fundamentally about regulating behavior, and behavior is
a product of both genes and environment, and the brain is an organ
designed by evolutionary processes to associate appropriate behavioral
outcomes with specific patterns of environmental stimuli, then it follows
that behavioral biology, and what it can teach us about brain design, is
highly important to law. The study of behavioral biology helps us to
increase the solidity of the behavioral model fulcrum on which law so
vulnerably relies. Put another way, we cannot achieve maximum
effectiveness of legal policy without a modem understanding of behavior.
We cannot understand behavior without understanding the brain. We
cannot understand the brain without understanding biology. And we cannot
understand biology without understanding evolutionary processes.
Consequently, maximum effectiveness of law requires (among many other
things, obviously) the study of evolutionary processes and their effects on
the biology of human behavior. As a consequence we may see, in coming
years, increasing use of evolutionary analysis in law, and increasing
integration of biology with other law-relevant disciplines, such as
psychology and economics.
Second, it is useful to gain a proprioceptive, deep-structure sense of
law. To have a sense of where our law is, how it got here, and where it's
going, we need to have a better sense of the processes that led law here,
and the constraints those processes impose upon the future. We can acquire
and sharpen that proprioceptive sense through the study of behavioral
biology, which affords a broader, richer, and more historically accurate
context for understanding law. Behavioral biology helps to reveal a
coherent sense of the deep structure in human legal systems, in part, by
providing a window on non-law-a window on the ways in which
evolutionary processes have importantly contributed to constraining and
winnowing the design space of law. And behavioral biology does this by
providing information about human brain design that is useful to
understanding both the function and the form of law, and which may
enable useful biolegal histories.
Third, what we see in the design of law is the product of a specialized
information processor-an organ far more akin to a swiss army knife than
it is to an empty beaker, a general-purpose computer, or a blank slate.
40
While the features of human law are not strictly inevitable, nor should they
be thought to be the product of infinitely variable culture, combined with
40. For more on this subject, see STEVENPINKER, THEBLANK SLATE: THEDENIAL OFHUMAN
NATURE IN MODERN INTELLECrUAL LIFE (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author).
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culturally contingent norms, mixed with accident, constrained by
economics, and preserved through either path-dependence or efficiency.
What we see when we look at the architecture of law, in the silhouette that
attention to non-law provides, is the unique brain signature of the human
animal, written by evolutionary processes and elaborated within the
sometimes generous dimensions of the design space that evolutionary
processes have not narrowly constricted.
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